Sunday, December 23, 2018

Part 1: Social Justice's Religious Sects - Setting the Stage

The analysis of radical social justice activist groups as de-facto religions or quasi-religions is increasing. Back in 2015 I tended to get a lot of push-back on the idea. Now it is increasingly entering into common discussions (like this recent Globe & Mail article).

Jonathan Haidt was the first to really popularize the idea. He did so via his Two Teloses lecture series. Of course the idea of applying religious labels to non-traditional religious like group dynamics isn't new. Demerath had an organizational science book on this in 1998.  I used this logic in my 2008 Master's work on systemic change designs. Although, I must say, I did so with a fair bit of pushback. At that point, the Science of Religion hadn't yet come of age. That disciple was still fairly nascent and  was still coming to terms with the New Atheist movement.  From my perspective, pushback against the New Atheist's growing evangelical-esque dynamics really pushed innovation in the Science of Religion. At the same time evolutionary tools were slowly seeping into the social sciences. The Science of Religion's adoption of gene-cultural tools has, in my mind, made a huge difference it what it can say about the grey areas of quasi-religious behaviour and behavioural groups.

In this post I'll look at (informally theorized) trajectories of new religious movements. I'll then use that to look at radical activist social justice groups. Will they match up? Will this process produce any novel insights, or is it just a futile exercise is bigotry justification and straw-manning?





TRAJECTORIES OF NEW RELIGIOUS MOVEMENTS
My general sense is that new religious movements tend to fall into a limited number of formulations / concentrations. Unfortunately classifications seem mainly based on intuition rather than any rigorous  phylogenetic work. But perhaps I'm just not up to date on the literature...

There is the sociological classification of new religious movements. Campbell's old cult classification may be the most relevant for my ends. This includes:
  1. a mystically-oriented illumination type
  2. an instrumental type, in which inner experience is sought for its effects, and
  3. a service-oriented type, which is focused on aiding others.
Cambells work is focussed on orientational intentions. I tend to favour a bit more behaviouralism. For example, where would Campell classify Amish or Hutterite Luddites? Probably in 2. Where would millennial doomsday cults fit in? Probably in 2. Hence, I think that it is just too big a category. So here is my sense of the break down:


Millennials
  • These are fairly concerned about ushering in a new utopia. In a decent number of cases, the ends justify the means. Mormonism had a heavy millennial influence during the 1840’s-60’s. Jehovah Witnesses had a heavy millennial phase, which I believe, climaxed around WW1.


Luddites
  • The main idea with these groups is that the benefits of progress are outweighed by its costs it. Cost benefit analysis is almost always done via social system calculations. Some movements just freeze society at a technology point near their departure time. Other movements retrench backward in time a ways. Amish and Hutterites are classic examples of Luddites. Mennonites are much more mixed. Popular attacks against North American Christianity and Christian dominated politics is often framed as retrenchments back to an imagined golden social age. In effect, they are attacked as weak social Luddites. In our era, a not insignificant number of people reject technology in Luddite like ways. Ludditism is almost exclusively technological in nature. But, I’m sure some radical social versions with moderate technological throttling would fit the bill too.


Cults
  • New Religious Movement (NRM) studies of the 80's were fascinated with the phenomenon of cults.  There was lots of hysterical pressure put on legal and political institutions in this regard. Remember all the cases of Satanist daycare worker abusing kids? Sounds like #metoo hyper-hysterics, no? Basically cults are largely defined as groups with super steep in-group out-group gradients who also happen to express a lot of the dynamical factors which characterize religion. They're usually based on, and driven by, charismatic leaders. But this isn't always true. A few cults manage to survive the inevitable charismatic leadership succession crises which most undergo and morph into reasonably legitimate religions. A host of religions from the 1830’s great awakening managed this feat. Most do not. Many cults are "millenialistic" (albeit frequently in new-age rather than classical ways). Most of the sects listed here are cultish on their fringes. While the cult category need not be separate, I think they’re behaviourally unique enough to warrant their own dimension spanning category rather than simply being a term used to describe the radical fringes of any given category.


Evangelicals
  • I probably shouldn't use this name for this purpose, but common parlance now broadly defines evangelical religions as those highly focussed on proselytization tinged with a decent amount of “we were warned you” sentiment. Evangelical formulations usually stabilize when they're combined with an easily demarkable "red pill" like conversion experience. This might be a born again confession, getting a testimony, or some similar dramatically profound change-act ritual.


Gnostics / Mystics
  • Gnosticism is largely characterized by a severe rejection of materialism and an extreme focus on mystical experience. In some ways, it can be imagined as the classic cultist who sits humming mantras to themselves while pursuing aesthetic ideals in order to get more in touch with mystical planes. While I was initially uncertain about the validity of this sub-set, Cambell has convinced me otherwise.

Revelatory (added in after going through the validation process)
• This religious trajectory is probably best characterized via the purposeful addition of what is interpreted as "fact" based knowledge additions. The process is usually via prophetic traditions, but need not be so. Catholicism systemic theology approach wouldn't be considered revelatory because of it rational logic focus. Revelatory religions are much more dynamic with knowledge acquisition. Often this produces too much revelation which then inspires infighting and validation / authorization issues. Historically, many new religious movements are energized in a revelatory phase and then, if they survive, tone things down. Revelatory knowledge has heightened epistemological value. Often it is responsive to timely existential angst issues. It is not fully shamanistic, but certainly intersects with that tradition.


Obviously these categories aren’t mutually exclusive. Campbell’s and other’s definitions are much better here. But the accuracy that comes from the necessary generalized parsing required by non-overlapping categorization probably poorly serves our analytical purposes.





VALIDATION
Instead of jumping right into social justice analysis, let’s take some time to look at some fringe religions and see how well they fit into our categorization.

Branch Davidians
  • Obviously religious. Clearly millenialistic. Also cultish.  I would probably think the millennialistic behaviour rules over the cultish. Everyone can be cultish, and non-Luddite separation from society didn’t quite seem to be their main game.


Scientology
  • Obviously religious. It seems to have started out as a cult, but managed to transition quite quickly to religious status. As history shows, producing scripture seems to aid this process. But, I don’t think any of my categories really match it. I suspect I need a new category for “revelatory” sects, whose main focus is on communication new information of divine importance.


Atheism +
  • As I understand it, atheism + is a social grouping that utterly denies the factual validity of supernaturalism, but recognizes the evolutionary importance of ritual and moral-based association. Their dynamics generally aren’t overly religious. The movement has a hard time retaining members. Proselytization tends to be very weak. Atheism+ is clearly not mystic. Rationalism isn’t overly concerned with the sublime. Neither is it millenialistic. It might strive for a better world via an aggregation of individual behavioural consequences, but it is a stretch to say it is focussed on ushering in a new world. Some atheist+ may envision and hope for a societal phase change via enough religious implosions to enable a more thorough secular phase change. But, generally the purpose of individual behaviour isn’t to effect a phase change, but to keep environmental degradation to a minimum, and to maximize their own well-being. Atheist+ is clearly not cultish. Thus, it fits no sect categorizations and should not be considered a religion nor on a religious vector.


Proud Boys
  • While I don’t know too much about their specific ideology, as far as I can tell, this group is mainly about defending the right of people to voice and choose political incorrect political leaders. Thus it is probably mainly a protest and counter-protest group. It has no millenialistic tendencies (unless you count status quo maintenance as millenialistic).  It is not Luddite. It may want to preserve social status quo. But even then, the group is somewhat anti-racist (via color blind goals at least). It is neither gnostic nor evangelical. The closest fit would be cultish. 
  • The group does fit a lot of the behavioural dynamics of religion. It has ritual, costly sacrifices, a grand narrative, and sacred values. It really doesn’t have much of a Big Brother though. Obviously this point could be argued. But, it seems more like a political cooperative than a group whose norms have such sacred value that there is a sense that going against them is wrong towards some bigger essence or semi-embodied group agent. Thus, Proud Boys really can’t be considered religious - even though their dynamics seem to hit a number of classic points. Their behaviour is also not reflective of any of the sect categorizations listed. 
  • My opinion could be change with more information on Big Brother roles, in-group out-group gradients, increased moral theorizing, or more mysticism or more millennialism. This suggest I had better make up a rating scale to see what cut-off scores would be sufficient for me to categorize a group as religious. In the past I've used Scott Atran’s work to tease out what is and isn't religious.



High 
(3)
Moderate (2)
Low 
(1)
Non-existent (0)
Moral Big Brother




Moral Big Brother’s embodiment level




Sacred values (volume)




Sacred values (significance lvl)




Common ritual (combo of significance & frequency)




Costly commitments




Clean hand actions




Avg degree of member’s identity fusion




Steepness of In-group out-group gradient






Arkeon
  • To find some other fringe religious movements, I consulted google. I tossed out the ones that seemed to be obvious offshoots of existing religions and did some superficial reading. Arkeon fit the bill, although as an offshoot of Reiki, I may be pushing things a little.
  • This is basically a charismatic movement that appears to be focussed on creating community feelings via rites of passage and ancestral history. Without much to go on, I’d suggest it’s mainly a mystical movement that doesn’t reject materialism. From the reaction of the Italian authorities, it’s probably fairly cultic. Without more information I really can’t classify it. But, if I was forced to, it seems religious. It’s NRM trajectory appears to either be that of a cult or a concretized mysticism.
Looking at my rough multi-factor rating scale analysis, it looks like 16/27 or so is a threshold value. Traditional religions are probably scoring 24 or 25 and above (out of 27). Supernaturalism, priesthood authority, and identity fusion seem to be the biggest areas of differentials compared to fringe religious movements.  According to my rating scale, fringe movements probably get a religious score (16+/27) via
  • strong moral big brothers, or 
  • via sacred values (the two really intertwine), or 
  • via cult like identity-fusion and steep in-group out-group gradients.



Atheist+

High 
(3)
Moderate (2)
Low 
(1)
Non-existent (0)
Moral Big Brother


X

Moral Big Brother’s embodiment level



X
Sacred values (volume)


X

Sacred values (significance lvl)


X

Common ritual (combo of significance & frequency)


X

Costly commitments



X
Clean hand actions



X
Avg degree of member’s identity fusion


X

Steepness of In-group out-group gradient



X
Sum = 5/27

Proud Boys

High 
(3)
Moderate (2)
Low 
(1)
Non-existent (0)
Moral Big Brother


X

Moral Big Brother’s embodiment level


X
x
Sacred values (volume)

X


Sacred values (significance lvl)


X

Common ritual (combo of significance & frequency)

X


Costly commitments


X

Clean hand actions


X

Avg degree of member’s identity fusion

X


Steepness of In-group out-group gradient


X

Sum = 12/27


A Proud Boys Version I’d Just Barely Label Religious (PB v1)

High 
(3)
Moderate (2)
Low 
(1)
Non-existent (0)
Moral Big Brother


X

Moral Big Brother’s embodiment level


X

Sacred values (volume)
X



Sacred values (significance lvl)
X



Common ritual (combo of significance & frequency)

X


Costly commitments


X

Clean hand actions
x



Avg degree of member’s identity fusion

X


Steepness of In-group out-group gradient


X

Sum = 17/27

A Proud Boys Version I’d Just Barely Label Religious (PB v2)

High 
(3)
Moderate (2)
Low 
(1)
Non-existent (0)
Moral Big Brother
X



Moral Big Brother’s embodiment level


X

Sacred values (volume)

X


Sacred values (significance lvl)


X

Common ritual (combo of significance & frequency)

X


Costly commitments

x


Clean hand actions


X

Avg degree of member’s identity fusion

X


Steepness of In-group out-group gradient

X


Sum = 16/27

Arkeon

High 
(3)
Moderate (2)
Low 
(1)
Non-existent (0)
Moral Big Brother

?
?

Moral Big Brother’s embodiment level
?
?


Sacred values (volume)


?

Sacred values (significance lvl)

?


Common ritual (combo of significance & frequency)
?



Costly commitments

?


Clean hand actions


?
?
Avg degree of member’s identity fusion
?



Steepness of In-group out-group gradient
?



Sum = 18.5/27



SOCIAL JUSTICE’S FIT

Now that the stage has been set, it may make sense to try my rather imperfect rubric to see how “Social Justice” might score from your perspective.


High 
(3)
Moderate (2)
Low 
(1)
Non-existent (0)
Moral Big Brother




Moral Big Brother’s embodiment level




Sacred values (volume)




Sacred values (significance lvl)




Common ritual (combo of significance & frequency)




Costly commitments




Clean hand actions




Avg degree of member’s identity fusion




Steepness of In-group out-group gradient






Social Justice (generalized based on radical activist actors, i.e. the top quartile of Critical Theory majors))

High 
(3)
Moderate (2)
Low 
(1)
Non-existent (0)
Moral Big Brother
X



Moral Big Brother’s embodiment level


X

Sacred values (volume)

X


Sacred values (significance lvl)
X



Common ritual (combo of significance & frequency)

X
X

Costly commitments

X


Clean hand actions
X



Avg degree of member’s identity fusion
X



Steepness of In-group out-group gradient

X
X

Sum = 20/27

When I did this, I got a generalized social justice score of 20/27. That was higher than the Arkeon cult! It was much higher than my threshold levels for Proud Boys. I have to admit, I was expecting something in the range of 14 to 18. Maybe I’m just really biased? Or, maybe there really is something to Social Justice as a religion? Or maybe my amateurish rating scale is crap?

When combined with other work analyzing Social Justice as a religion:

this point of inquiry seems genuine. The way our current great religious awakening is likely to intertwine governance and religion via “Social Justice” in a possible 3rd major religious evolutionary transition is a potentially very significant occurrence. Arguably nations (via the justice of immigration and the criminalization of hate dissent) are breaking apart as a result of this. Europe has already fractured over it. The topic of understanding this phenomenon seems rather sanguine.

Onto It

This analysis is not intended to show that Social Justice is a religion. Rather, the purpose it to investigate its potential sects. If none of its sub-groups match up with standard new religious movement sect categories, it is pretty unlikely that Social Justice itself as an umbrella group is religious. Similarly if most of its sub-groups match up with one or two closely related sect categories, then it may be likely that Social Justice itself will orient to those cultural wells. Something about its future trajectory may therefore be inferred or attempted to be inferred.

Part 2 will be the analysis of social justice sects

Thursday, December 20, 2018

Part 3 Live Blog: Postmodern Religion & the Faith of Social Justice

Here's the third instalment of my "live blog" of James Lindsay's Aero article, Postmodern Religion & the Faith of Social Justice





Pocket Epistemologies

I’m looking forward to this section. What is the epistemological justification for Social Justice religion, and how closely does it match religious epistemologies. 

James is definitely applying a Stephen Gould non-overlapping magisteria frame to things here. Based on his objective, I can see why he chose this. Personally, I'm not big on Gould's idea. As per Stuart Kauffman, I tend to be more pragmatic (in the technical sense) and see there being multiple espitemolgoical paths for different types of questions, none of which are ever completely pure.

James lays out pocket epistemologies as a method religionists use to justify dear moral preferenes/stances/ideologies. As per Haidt's motivated reasoning, desire precedes justification. Thus pocket epistemologies come after a desired moral solution space is occupied.




I think Lindsay overstates his case a bit here. Rationalization via pocket epistemologies may just be a case of pragmatically coming to the truth. But, that depends on how much of your core moral foundation you’re willing to erode. Hence the fundamental role analysis of sacred value protection plays in determining the extent to which something is or is not religious.



This is a good point, but I’m not sure one can conclude “chances are good it’s a faith-based project”. I really think you need a multi-factor behavioural dynamic approach for accurate religious characterizations. Of course that should intersect a bit with epistemological and reasoning methodologies. But I don’t think there is ever one “smoking gun” to be found in this game. Even subtle connotations of silver-bullet signals are, to me, counter-productive. This is especially valid in obviously contentious topic such as this one.




A Focus on the Unconscious
Perhaps James is going to get to an analysis of reasoning methods… ? I’m not sure how well one can see into people’s heads. But, perhaps I’m just underestimating what well-informed academics might know...



As an aside, I find it interesting how Jame’s comment here resonates with Canadian legal jurisprudence on the issue.


I like the definition James uses for "spiritual ". He basically defines it as morality with purpose. I’d suggest that the word purpose needs beefed up and refined, though. Perhaps it should relate strongly back to adaptive-group purposes which are fitness enhancing due to group cohesion effects and environmental niche construction effects. Maybe you can get by with just the environmental niche construction bit? Aren't group cohesion effects (within a loose sub-level of selection) just environmental niche constructions? While one doesn't have to think this way. One certainly can...



Looks like he got to the same spot I thought he needed to get to. 


I think James hits the nail on the head here. One of the more prominent (but not always necessary) factors of religion is a narrative that gives meaning to life. One caveat; Shamanism doesn’t give meaning to life per se. Rather it embodies people’s existential angsts. Thus is it meaning making or angst embodiment?

Shamanism doesn’t have to give people purpose. it just has to alleviate existential stress by helping people with awareness or catharsis. For instance does cognitive therapy provide meaning or does it just help people with personal issues?

I’m not sure I like Jame’s use of Haidt’s definition of divinity. It certainly makes some qualitative points. But just because people apply a term in a certain way does not mean it is applicable to the item under discussion. Thus labelling social justice elevation as “divine” co-opts religious language, but does so with only appeal-to-authority validity. I’d much rather see something more falsifiable. In that sense, the general idea of moral purpose elevation is correct, but it should be defended via multi-factor match-ups with religion more than by finding other academics who use religious labels for things.

But, I will concede, this is a good explanatory strategy for people who may be coming into this topic somewhat cold.


The “coolness” argument falls flat for me.


Ritual, Redemption, and Prayer
Funny to see social media posts analogized as prayer. I hadn’t thought of that before.

I guess the big question I have is, why are we matching religious phenomenon to things? Is it because these particular cultural solutions reflect similar underlying phenomenon? This analogous structure approach (whales have flippers, fish have fins), doesn’t reflect a common phylogenetic tree. Rather, it reflects common environmental landscape design constraints. 

This issue is important because Jame’s argument infers that, as a re-invention, social justice religion should reproduce analogous structures. The argument of social justice as a major evolutionary transition would posit homologous structures (with a very few major novel structures that have run-away via punctuated processes (rapid growth once divergence occurs)).

I don’t know how, in practice, one teases these things out. But it is interesting to see the progress in my thinking on this topic since the first post in this series. I guess there is a purpose to close reading responses…


I do like how James frames the protest-as-ritual problem. Protests become ritual once they lose their focus and become general events meant to unify participants rather than effect any pointed change or communicate any specific message. This is the best formulation of this equivalency that I’ve seen.

You still get left with the question of whether occupying space in order to show you have rights is or is not a ritual. For example, Proud Boys conduct some of their rallies to show that free speech isn’t dead, and that everyone has a right to walk and be together unmolested. In some ways these things have no point. It is sort of like a dog marking their territory. So, are these events generalized religious ritual, or a space marking game? 

For Proud Boys who are always under antifa attack, I’d say such "focusless" events are more space marking than ritual. For social justice activists who don’t get attacked and confronted when they rally, I’d say such "focusless" events are less space marking and more ritual.




Gender Nuns and the Grand Wizards of the Diversity Board

Who cares about content. This is just a wonderful title!

In terms of content for this section, I suspect a framing of complicated language in terms of slightly counter-intuitive belief optimization would have been more rigorous. Religions tend to maximize memetic fitness at the expense of factual validity. Of course you need to caveat this a bit. Immediate factual validity isn’t tossed out willy-nilly. It is replaced by meta-narrative validity; lessons that matter on long time frames and which derive value from continual intersection. Of course, sometimes the factual accuracy part just gets replaced by supernaturalism which, strictly speaking, is not necessary for narrative lessons. But, it is useful for Big Brother comprehension and respect….

Don’t underestimate the utility and optimization of religion….

The End

Wednesday, December 19, 2018

Part 2 Live Blog: Postmodern Religion & the Faith of Social Justice

Social Justice Institutionalized

This should be an interesting topic. I suspect James will try to show how University Critical Theory departments and Diversity offices supply the hierarchical web necessary for 
  • coherent sect replication
  • authorized hierarchal imprimatur
  • base level indoctrination and proselytization.

Guess we’ll see. I’m looking forward to be surprised. I have a feeling James may have some novel takes here….


I really liked the way James framed these first few sentences. In evolutionary lingo, organizational structure is niche construction. It is what adaptive groups do to tweak their environment so it is appropriately fitness enhancing. Adjusting the environment too much may be not worth the effort and hence counter productive. Bar-yam’s simulations on virus virility fit in nicely here.

One question this raises for me is, do religions, like viruses, have bounds for how much environmental manipulation is too little and how much is too much? Virility quotients probably only make sense in terms of long-term stability patterns. And, even then, pragmatics and Bar-Yam’s simulation both show periodic break-offs to high/low virile probes. As a new religious movement, Social Justice may be going down the cultish path of virile overshoot. But, if it is a long term social structure, chances are its just turning the corner on its cultish growth phase. If so, you’d expect to seem some fairly predictable changes in how it propagates.

One change I’d expect is more reliance on organizational structures. However, Social Justice as a religious evolutionary transition may do something radical here. I’d also expect more word of mouth propagation and expansion via physical segregation (i.e. majority SJW communities).


I think I’ve already mentioned how the intertwining between religion and governance is fairly foundational to their adaptiveness. The ability of a religion to grab state power is usually an extremely fit memetic solution. Think of how the Christian meme cluster benefitted from Constatine’s endorsement. Or think of how medieval Christianity fared when it co-opted European chiefdom governance controls.

Many people’s worry about social justice is precisely how new moral criminal law is functionally out of public control and firmly in the power of social justice religious ardents. I know my critiques back in the late 90’s were precisely about this possibility. Obviously these critiques were fully marginalized as slippery slope fallacies. It is interesting to see them come to fruition. It is more interesting yet to see just how far they can go. I expect they will go very far.

For instance, I very much doubt religions who pay priests for services will be able to discriminate in their hiring on any behaviour (like sexual mores) which touches any protected class status. For instance, I strongly suspect that in a decade or two you’ll see gender based priesthood exclusions challenged under human right codes. In Canada at least, these codes are very clear about which side the law is on. Similarly teachings that promote “traditional gender roles” is likely to be another hill upon which things will break. Expect selective prosecution to save minority’s from being challenged for their equivalent discriminatory practices. Thus, I think James’ point about tolitalitarian tendencies is very apt. How many religions that have co-opted state control have tended to pluralistic practice?


Again, I think this is an excellent point. I love how well Jame’s argument about the epistemological parallels between Social Justice religion and religion come back around to re-enforce his worries about university take over.  Universities are the meme’s main propagation and validation tool. To appropriate Dawkin’s viral interpretation of religion, it is as if the social justice religion virus has found the perfect host replicator. Not only does it propagate. It stamps an imprimatur of authority and validation. You couldn’t ask for more!

And, this gets back to the point I’m most interested in - is social justice religion a re-invention or a major evolutionary transition?  Did it stumble upon University as a replicator by random Darwinian processes (exploration of the adjacent possible), or did this landscape serve as part of the paradigm in which novel memes-clusters emerged and were winnowed out?


Another great quote. No commentary needed.





The Scholarly Canon
I’m expecting a bit of an overextension here. Guess we’ll see…

Having read this section, I’m glad James didn’t engage with the metaphorical / narrative truth claims now popular via Jordan Peterson. It would have been a pointless target. I’m a little surprised he didn’t delve into the self-referential citations circles that end up reproducing appeal-to-authority dynamics and virtue-based job progression (ie. the most “righteous” move from priest to bishop to cardinal). I think that would have been needless inflammatory. Glad he committed it.





Faith in Social Justice
From the title of the article, this should be the heart of the argument. I’m interested. I wouldn’t have considered faith the point around which I would centre my argument. That’s why it is always nice to listen to what other people say.


Just wondering how you would falsify this idea of faith. Could a transactional business that don’t leverage moral values “look to the assurance of things hoped for”? Perhaps the answer is only no if we define “hoped for” in terms of some moral outcome. But how do you tease an outcome which is moral from one which is not? That’s not very easy. It seems to revolve around intentions about the betterment of people ideological choices and intentions. “We want them to think better” (i.e. more morally correctly).





The Mythological Core of Applied Postmodernism

The idea that social justice isn’t just a couple of isolated memes, but rather a fairly coherent narrative is interesting. Most academic theories are not narrative in nature. Getting a good narrative that resonates with psychological cognitive wells is a strong sign that you’ve got something more than an academic theory. Again, I’d tend to look for Atran’s behavioural descriptors to assess the degree to which things are or are not religious. Jordan Peterson’s work is generally informative here (not in a prescriptive way, but more in a “get up to speed” in case you’ve missed out on being in the middle of non-simplistic religious theology).

Again, the parallel matching done in this section is probably useful for a general audience. I’d be more interested and moved by a falsifiable narrative feature analysis…. Religious stories fit a certain range of unbelievability within the slightly-counter-intuitive belief spectrum. You don’t need supernaturalism. You need memorability and a perception of layers of unending depth. Post-modernism gives that to you. The intersectional application reduces the level of unbelievability. And, I suspect, helps the narrative structure resonate at the right level of counter-intuitiveness / quasi-factuality.

It’s hard to judge if the result is any more or any less quasi-factual than most materialistically biased forms of supernaturalism. I would say, in terms of modern contexts, the unbelievability level is about equal. It’s just that now days, anything supernatural is automatically viewed as exceptional unbelievable. But a couple of hundred years ago, I’d suggest the level of unbelievability by a lay person would be about as similar as the level of unbelievability post modernism and intersectionality are to modern laity. But, again, this is hard to judge.

What does seem clear though, is that social justice religion is not shooting for believability within a supernatural paradigm or set of supernaturalistic believers. It is a re-invention for a set of secularists.


I’d also add that it appears that a number of radical social justice advocates come across as somewhat “flaky”. By that I mean that they more be more akin to flighty drama major that hard-nosed grounded engineers. Additionally the social supports many require hint at higher levels of neuroses and mental health issues, at least in some sub-set populations. Now this may simply be an artefact of groupings. But, it is certain that some of the sub-groups affiliated with these movements clearly have statistically above average risk factors. That is after all, part of why they are fighting for social justice! Our systems are structurally unfair as evidenced by disproportionate mental trauma rates…

Religion-Governance Inter-evolution: Social Justice as a Major Religious Evolutionary Transition

Image from http://www.religionandsociety.org.uk/
Does the new wave of quasi-legally enforced social justice "woke-ism"represent a major evolutionary transition in religion and governance?

After going over some previous major evolutionary transitions, I'll suggest that it is certainly possible. Our current Great Moral Awakening, may reflect something much bigger than another turn on our normal 50 year socio-political instability cycle.






BACKGROUND

Researchers like Ara Norezayan have published plausible evidence about the co-evolution of religion and societal governance via long-term pacing and leading cycles. Religion comes up with a cultural innovation facilitated by the landscape changes produced by governance. Religion's resultant landscape changes then prime things for governance innovations and evolutions. The two iterate.

Change occurs culturally, but is primed, fertilized and stabilized due to gene-cultural trait selection.  Thus, processes aren't purely cultural. Rather, genetic factors (which likely facilitate or stabilize certain cultural traits) are important, ne essential.

The easiest way to conceptualize this is via domestication processes. Domestication is a gene-cultural process. People, like other animals, are clearly domesticable. You just need a selection process. War and differential fitness (via most any selection process) work quite well here. Multi-level selection theory, while not required, helps endogenize this process with respect to human groups / social structures.





HISTORICAL EXAMPLES

Toblecki Temple
Peter Turchin
The archeological record from Toblecki temple suggests a significant social change somewhere around 10,000 years ago. This is generally interpreted as a religious gathering that suppressed conflict to enable beyond-tribal level gatherings. Religious studies folk generally interpret this as a signal for the move away from implicit religion, which is non-separable from tribal culture, to explicit religion, which is distinguishable from tribal culture. In effect, this reflects an inflection point where religion became a distinguishable performance or constrainable set of beliefs or practices.

According to Norezayan and others, this also reflects a change-point where chiefdom sized governance strategies were finally able to fully emerge.


God-Kings
You see the initiation of another major evolutionary transition point during the emergence of god-king governance. Typically chiefdoms temporarily aligned together during times of existential crises via distinct religious and war/political leaders. Separation of powers weakened the risks of authoritarian usurpation. As Norezayan says, sometime the religious leader or war leader was killed (or you had one person doing both roles for whatever reason) and the mantle of both roles fell on one. Then it is reasonable to assume that sometimes an attempt would have been made to stabilize that power and large group control. But, with a small population, it is hard to provide sufficient protection for the usurper. Round the clock bodyguards manned by kin relations are likely insufficiently numerous to stave off assassination. However, as society size increases, king-guard size may prove sufficient. The organizational requirements for an effective coup are sized large enough to be politically detectable.

Egypt (among other states) revealed one solution, god-king ideology. However, while this solution slightly extended the time frame before assassination, a religious-governance solution seemed to be what really stabilized things.

A moral solution which normed leaders to give back to the people solved stability issues. For instance, if a god-king could save enough grain to get through the area's periodic droughts, then the state was well situated to survive over an extended period of time.

I tend to think of religion as providing the moral force (and believable-enough promises) necessary to prevent catastrophic leader gaming of resource extraction for vainglorious rather than pro-social ends. Thus the god-king transition is an example of a governance transition which appropriated religious landscape resources/innovations.


Universalizing Religion
I usually cite Cyrus the Great (~500BCE) as one of the first examples of state-level religious pluralism facilitation. Religious pluralism was a governance intervention that facilitated various gene-cultural landscape changes out of which universalizing religion was eventually able to emerge.

Universalizing religions can be seen as a major (cultural) evolutionary transition. The firm belief that a given set of ideologies and ideological based practices were universally useful for different cultures, without having to totally reform said cultures, was a major innovation. Not only were religion and culture largely separable (to a degree at least), religion was a unifying force. A landscape was produced in which elevated levels of proselytization addressed some governance goals. Religion and governance intertwined.


Monotheism
I've skipped over the evolutionary transition to mono-theism. I don't think its importance should be minimized. But, I just don't think I need to say much about it. I'd probably class it as a moderate rather than a major transition. Plus, inferences in how it may have affected governance is much more conjectural than other phase changes.


Protestantism
In terms of western religious tradition, the emergence of Protestantism in the era of Luther represents what I'd call a moderate or perhaps even minor evolutionary transition. Transition was from a centralized, highly hierarchical religion, to a less centralized, less hierarchical religion. Great Religious Awakening cycles further decentralization.

Our latest Great Religious Awakening, characterized by "social justice", reflects not just another decentralization shuffling, but, likely, a full religious evolutionary transition.



WHY SOCIAL JUSTICE is a (RELIGIOUS) EVOLUTIONARY TRANSITION


Religion has been traditionally associated with supernaturalism. Moral Big Brothers reflect an ability to

  • punish immoral behaviour, even if not caught in the present,
  • adjudicate what is and isn't moral behaviour,
  • reward good behaviour.
  • see into people's minds to judge intent,
  • etc.
Scott Atran in "In God's We Trust" lays out an exceptionally strong exposition of the evolutionary utility of these and other religiously associated behaviours.

The rise of atheism and its likely minimal immediate effects of social cohesion capital suggest many people now have gene-cultural traits different from the past. I doubt 200 years ago an atheistic society would have survived. Whether or not this would have been because of intra-group collapse or inter-group competition is interesting but tangential.  Strong supernaturalism is now, increasingly superfluous to adaptive group formation and stabilization, provided it is compensated by other adaptive group factors (however, no formal work has been done on this that I know of - so consider such speculation common sense)

Sects of social justice are well-considered behaviourally similar to religion*. James Lindsay's newest work adds to this body of work. The major differences between social justice quasi-religion and traditional religion is the minimization or elimination of supernaturalism. When you look at other moral-groups which are also adaptive (from an evolutionary sense) you tend to find the following factors minimized or eliminated, and the following factors kept:**
  • Big Brothers
  • Supernaturalism (minimized or eliminated)
  • strong norm enforcement
  • steep in-group out group-gradients (moderated)
  • sacred values (moderated)
  • clean hands / purity (minimized or eliminated)
  • ritual
  • counter-intuitions / quasi-factuals (minimized)
  • costly commitments (moderated)



Social justice hits many religious factors. Major differences are

  • supernaturalism
  • radical decentralization which nonetheless re-invents identity-based groupings.
James Lindsay takes the position that these differences reflect the idea that the phenomenon of religion has been re-invented in a modern secular paradigm without any appeal to or connection to religion. I largely agree. However, I think gene-cultural reasoning suggests what we might actually be seeing is another pacing-and-leading between religion and governance facilitated by gene-culture landscape changes produced by religion and governance. In effect, "social justice" is built on a series of cultural innovations that make it seem like it is a complete re-invention. Why? Because it is ridiculous to think "social justice" was picking and choosing religious modules to replace and supplant. Solutions may certainly have been influenced by ingrained gene-culture wells (aka darwin machines or cognitive dispositions). But the formation of the social justice dynamical solution space was clean. Thus influences are probably;
  • gene-cultural,
  • spear head "phylogenetics"
  • and implicit, not overt.

It is the lack of continuity with past religion that I think marks radical social justice activist sects as a likely major evolutionary transition in religion. The way it intertwines with governance means it is very likely to produce some major, long lasting effects. This isn't just a one-off blip like the Roman-Orthodox split, or the slow rise of Mormonism as a new world religion. This is BIG. This interacts with governance in some very new and some potentially very disturbing ways (or very productive ways - depending upon your ideology).






CAVEATS
One thing to remember is that new religious movements have a very poor track record at long-term survivability. How many religions were formed during the Great Religious Awakening of the 1820's-1840's? How many of those are around today?

Just because radical social justice activist groups have a pretty good potential to grow, expand and change the governance and religion landscape, does not mean that it will.

Social justice is starting to experience severe blow back in areas like free speech, open borders, ever expanding positive-styled human rights. As Steve Bannon is found of saying, the push back against globalist agendas is happening on both the "left" and the "right". From the left via economic nationalism. And, on the right via ethno / cultural or patriotic nationalism. Pervasive retrenchment away from globalism and back to strong nationalism may cripple social-justice-as-religion growth.

Chances are, it won't. But one never knows.

Similarly, social-justice-as-religion may simply de-virulize.  There are lots of different sects  of social justice. Puritanism, functional Ludditists, evangelicals (strong proselytizers), millennial-esque utopians, authoritarian governance strains, etc). It is not certain what competition between these groups may produce.

But, no matter what, things are interesting!




________________________
Notes
* some extra reference on behaviour and dynamical approaches to religious definition


** these factors come out of Scott Atran's "In Gods we Trust" excellent evolutionary psychology work. Arran doesn't explicitly make this list, but they're pretty easy to gather and categorize, even without a close reading.