Creedal religious confessions seem to be a
structural feature of universalizing religions. This might range from
fairly basic "there is no god but Allah and
Mohammed is his prophet" to technical Nicene-like statements.
Recently a statement of confession and commitment
was produced by Christian faculty members from across the United States. In the tribalized trajectory of Western
society, what might this portend and what light does cultural-evolution theory
shed on the general dynamics of groups evolving to formal-creedal practice?
Background
Tribal religions "just are". In highly implicit cultures where religion,
group membership and culture have no boundaries, technically precise definitions
of minimal belief standards are non-sensical. Beliefs aren’t aren’t designed to make sense
to outsiders and they certainly aren’t optimized for proselytization.
However, religion and governance (Norezayan, 2013)
have co-evolved. Some multi-level
selection researchers view this as a series punctuated co-evolutionary steps
(Turchin, Norezayan, Atran). Basically
human groups bounce around an evolution-transition-landscape* which due to
between-group competition selects for highly cohesive highly coordinated small
groups or less continuously cohesive less continuously coordinated large
groups.
Under some conditions large groups can outcompete
smaller more efficient groups. In other
conditions they can’t. Tensions between
within-group selection and between-group selection makes the whole scenario
rather complex (in the technical sense of the word). But, evidence strongly suggest a directional
arrow to the products of selection*: Increasingly larger groups facilitated by
better conflict minimization tools, better coordinating tools and sufficient
within-group dependencies.
The emergence and stabilization of universalizing
religion as a higher-level of selection was, in part facilitated by overt
belief structures and easier in-group immigration paths.
A small-group "coherence" approach minimizes
within-group freeloading at the expense of size. A large-group
"size" approach threads the omnipresent freeloading needle by making
essential norms very overt and by leveraging various natural tendencies for
group-to-individual biasing. Obviously religion and quasi-religious
dynamics are very effective in this regard. Atran's “In God's We Trust”
provides a pretty good base in this regard. Norezayan's “Big Gods” makes
a compelling evolutionary argument why these dynamics are selected for (albeit
only making tangential use of formal multi-level selection tools).
The Big Question
This multi-level lens leads to some interesting speculation
about the dynamical landscape of formal belief (creedal) statements within the
intersection of academia and todays increasingly tribablized quasi-religious political
environment.
Speculation will avoid value-based analyses. While I favour the conflict minization that
comes with higher levels of selection, I’m also pragmatic enough to realize
some structures just aren’t yet stable enough (selection amongst component
actors hasn’t stabilized the conditions required for an evolutionary
“transition”). Unfortunately this
situates conversation in the world of utilitarianism. As a naïve non-philosopher, I see not way
around this. So, this argument is
obviously subject to all the faults and critiques inherit with utilitarianism. Alternative suggestions are welcome.
I’ll talk about the dynamics of creeds in
religious-secular intersections by situating the formalization of belief in a
multi-level selection context. This will
be done by showing how creedal statements function as a higher-level of
selection for an individual and a lower-level of selection for a nation-state.
Next, I’ll frame this as a classic example of tension between adjacent levels
of selection. This brings in complex
oscillatory dynamics. When expressed in
a sufficiently large population we should therefore see multiple (drift) paths
expressed. Gene-culture co-evolution
suggests which paths are (stochastic) wells. The cultural phenotypes of these
wells will be explored and compared to some recent examples of quasi-religious
secular social movements who have also tended to semi-formal creedal-like
confessions. I’ll then speculate, using
cultural evolutionary insights, what difference the explicitness of formalized
creeds might make. Finally, I’ll remind
you that just because formalization may facilitate between-group competition
does not mean that creeds are either good or bad. Rather it means that good intentions can have
bad outcomes and bad intentions can have good outcomes. I’ll tackle this by coming back to the issue
of time scales and units of analysis.
Creeds & Levels of Selection
The academic “statement of confession and commitment”
presents an interesting case study in levels of selection. It brings together a number of Christian
faculty from across the country. Its
pretty likely that signatories will “have each other’s backs”. In other words, the signing of this
confession increases the probability of mutual support, especially as related
to attacks against the morality espoused therein, and the ability to espouse
such morality within academic settings.
While some signatories may view this creed as simply a “good-enough”
statement of their own values, the group nature of this statement makes
omission of a functional analysis naive.
Functionally, why a joint statement? Why a statement at all? A levels of selection analysis looks at these
functional question in terms of whether it brings people together as a group or
separates them into smaller groups.
This question is not simple. Human acts are nested in multiple strong and weak
overlapping group hierarchies. For
instance, what is the functional effect of this type of creed on a University
as a whole? On a pluralistic political society? On a nation torn by questions
of open or closed borders? On a lone individual in an isolated university department?
In this regard delving into a deconstruction of the
creed itself may just muddy the waters.
Some might find the creed unifying.
Some may find it divisive. Do we
arbitrate who is right?
My particular approach is to simply reference classic
studies, especially those in social identification theory,
which suggest identity politics – well intentioned or not, tends to lead to clearly
identifiable groups which then (probabilistically of course) increase the
likelihood of between-group competition.
But, in this regard trajectory is key. Identity politics may facilitate a move up a
level of selection; individuals coalesce as small groups which can then
coalesce as groups of small groups (medium groups), and so on… But identity politics may also facilitate
tribalization. Large group cohesion is
replaced by a focus on smaller group ties.
Instead of nationalism, we get various levels of tribalism. Does nationalism disappear? Of course not. Rather the tension between adjacent levels of
selection is tweaked.
Which way do things go? In most cases, we just
don’t know. Speculation exceeds error
bounds by quite a bit. We do know that
as the fitness between adjacent levels of selection become equivalent the
degree of complexity in cycling between adjacent levels increases
commensurately (Okasha, 2006). But, not
knowing which way things will go doesn’t mean we’re blind.
For instance, a recent Nature co-authored by Nowak (who
has done a lot of simulation work in the field of evolutionary altruism) suggests
pairwise bonds facilitate within-group altruism. Too many connections limit the conditions
necessary for reciprocal altruism. Too
few connections and altruism can’t spread.
Cordes and Richerson (among lots of others) have also done good
technical work in this field.
Unfortunately in a world with multiple level of selections, “pairwise”
is always relative… is it between
individuals? Between small groups? Medium groups, etc. The math is agnostic on scale.
A random walk approach (aka. the default drift
hypothesis previously mentioned) is quite useful in large populations. Most every possible walk eventually gets
expressed. What then matters then is comparing
potential paths to natural evolutionary wells.
In other words, what proximate causes influence (stochastically) the relative
cultural fitness of different paths?
This doesn’t imply what will happen.
It simply informs what is likely to happen if the population is large
and our gene-culture co-evolution information is accurate.
Gene-Culture Co-evolution
For a primer on gene-co-evolution
basics watch a classic presentation on lactase persistence or look
at the classic Cavali-Sforza book or the Boyd Richerson version or any of the
modern stuff by Gintis, Mesoudi, Henrich and others. Darwin’s Cathedral is a good intro as well.
Although it doesn’t get into the technicalities of dual inheritance much, it’s
a classic work on multi-level selection insights into religion, quasi-religion
and adaptive group resonances.
Some of the most salient applications can be
summarized by combining D.S. Wilson’s and Scott Atran’s works. Adaptive groups resonate around
morality. As List
& Pettit (2011) show, quasi-real group agents emerge in
non-deterministic judgment aggregation problems via a process of inferred moral
ascription. Both Wilson and Atran
suggest hypsentitive agent detection heuristics do this, as does a strong
fitness advantage for being able to predict other people’s actions (in a way
where false positive are much less problematic than false negatives).
Once groups start getting moral, the tensions
between within-group selection and between-group selection (i.e. freeloading
vs. altruism) are well handled by religious / quasi-religious processes. Atran’s “In Gods We Trust” is excellent
here. Religion is fit for a good
reason. Sacrilized politics is similarly
fit for the same reasons. The different
degree of embodiment of “moral Big Brothers” and relative levels of
supernaturalism, is, in my mind, of secondary importance. Human dynamics are similar at the first
order.
As per Atran, processes which enhance group
adaptiveness include:
- Shared rituals
- Moral Big Brothers
- Slightly counter-intuitive (and hence highly memorable) memes
- Costly commitment displays
- Norm enforcement
- Hard to fake beliefs & actions
At extreme levels of morality identify fusion processes come into
play. However, it seems like these are
mainly expressed during periods of severe group competition or as “loss
leaders” amongst population tails who facilitate group expansion via slightly
counter-intuitive costly commitment displays (think of the first Christian’s
seemingly maladaptive martyr fixations) or “don’t mess with us” dynamics.
Comparisons
But enough theorizing, what insights does this give
us with regard to creedal dynamics?
This might be best seen by looking at
quasi-religious secular social movements who have also tended to semi-formal
creedal-like confessions. Here are some
obviously non-random examples.
We are intentional about amplifying the particular experience of
state and gendered violence that Black queer, trans, gender nonconforming,
women and intersex people face… we know that patriarchy, exploitative
capitalism, militarism, and white supremacy know no borders. We stand in
solidarity with our international family against the ravages of global
capitalism and anti-Black racism, human-made climate change, war, and
exploitation
Antifa
No formal creedal statements are readily
available. Morality is situated around
attacking/resisting authoritarianism especially as represented by neo-nazi’s
and far right politics. There are
obvious intersections between anti-patriarchy, anti-capitalism, and minority
empowerment. Allowing the normalization
of authoritarianism and repression are clearly seen as sins.
Donald Trump is building a
broad coalition as he makes an historic run for the White House. We were among
the first to recognize the LGBT community had a place in his campaign. As
Americans from all walks of life listen to Trump's message of economic
nationalism, American exceptionalism, and limited government, those of us in
the LGBT community should start paying close attention. Now that America has
entered a post-Marriage Equality era, it is time for the LGBT community to stop
viewing politics through the narrow lens of the culture war and start engaging
the whole political spectrum. For too long LGBT folks were told they had to be
Democrats to be for equality. Well, those times have changed and it is time for
us to unshackle ourselves from the ideology of the past and embrace the ideas
of the future.
Inclusion, diversity, equity, and accessibility are
central to the mission and principles of the March for Science. Scientists and people who care about
science are an intersectional group, embodying a diverse range of races, sexual
orientations, gender identities, abilities, religions, ages, socioeconomic and
immigration statuses. We, the march organizers, represent and stand in
solidarity with historically underrepresented scientists and science advocates.
We are united by our passion to pursue and share knowledge.
We acknowledge that society and scientific
institutions often fail to include and value the contributions of scientists
from underrepresented groups. Systems
of privilege influence who becomes a part of the science community, what topics
we study, and how we apply our work in creating new technologies and crafting
policy. We recognize that, historically and today, some scientific endeavors
have been used to harm and oppress marginalized communities. Political actions
-- such as gag orders for government science agencies, funding freezes,
immigration bans, and policy changes blocking action on climate change -- lead
to greater damage for vulnerable populations. Science itself can drive our
conversations about the importance of diversity, as it provides us with the
data to understand how systemic bias and discrimination impact our communities
and how best to change it
Given that, since 1948, hundreds of UN resolutions have
condemned Israel's colonial and discriminatory policies as illegal and called
for immediate, adequate and effective remedies; and
Given that all forms of international intervention and
peace-making have until now failed to convince or force Israel to comply with
humanitarian law, to respect fundamental human rights and to end its occupation
and oppression of the people of Palestine; and
In view of the fact that people of conscience in the
international community have historically shouldered the moral responsibility
to fight injustice, as exemplified in the struggle to abolish apartheid in South
Africa through diverse forms of boycott, divestment and sanctions; and Inspired
by the struggle of South Africans against apartheid and in the spirit of
international solidarity, moral consistency and resistance to injustice and
oppression;
We, representatives of Palestinian civil society, call upon
international civil society organizations and people of conscience all over the
world to impose broad boycotts and implement divestment initiatives against
Israel similar to those applied to South Africa in the apartheid era. We appeal
to you to pressure your respective states to impose embargoes and sanctions
against Israel. We also invite conscientious Israelis to support this Call, for
the sake of justice and genuine peace.
But how is any of this different from the vision
statement of business and other institutions?
The evolution of intersectionality provides one interesting data point.
From McKibbin
et. al (2015)
Carbin and Edenheim argue that intersectionality has shifted
from being a metaphor grounded in structuralist ontology to being an
overarching feminist theory which makes explicit an ontology of neither the
subject nor power. Intersectionality is no longer defined as a metaphor for the
way in which intersecting systems of oppression impact on women’s
subjectivities, but is referred to in the literature variously as a
methodology, a tool for data analysis, a nodal point in feminist theory, a
feminist project or platform, and a framework for social policy development.
But is this academic parsing of categories or
belief-based tribablization? I would
argue it can be all of these, with the key being the nodal aspect of
bifurcations. This gets back to the
value of a random walk approach where various paths are analyzed according to
likely gene-culture wells.
I would also argue that for some,
perhaps many groups, intersectionality has become a creedal like confession. For example the distinction between second
wave and third wave feminism revolves around intersectionality
and the targeting of resources/concern.
A case in point is whether Beyonce’s sexualization can be considered
“feminist”.
White feminism is a set of beliefs that allows for the exclusion
of issues that specifically affect women of color. It is ‘one size-fits
all’ feminism, where middle class White women are the mold that others must
fit. It is a method of practicing feminism, not an indictment of
every individual White feminist, everywhere, always.”
It is usually not that overt, and most White feminists would
deny that this is what’s being said or done, but you notice it in more subtle
comments like “Why do you have
to divide us by bringing up race?” or “Are trans women
really women? There should be a distinction.”
In the face of calls for a more intersectional feminism, there
are even White feminists who claim the whole concept of intersectionality is
just academic jargon that doesn’t connect with the real world.
Yet the irony seems lost on some feminists who make these claims
while staunchly opposing the language of
“humanism” in place of “feminism.”
Simply put, it’s not those who are calling for a feminism that
is responsive to the specific issues they face that are being divisive. It’s
those of us who refuse to acknowledge the need for an intersectional ethic in
feminism.
A certain type of belief is required for membership
in certain types of groups. This belief is moral. In business is making money a morality? Perhaps for some wall-streeters. But for most employees it is a transactional
good. Sacred values attachment is
minimal. This is what distinguishes a business value statement that may or may
not be moral and may or may not be morally interpreted from moralized creedal
statements like the Christian faculty’s Statement
of Confession and Commitment.
In-group actions are communicated as moral and out-group actions as
immoral (implied or overt).
The
Difference of Explicitness
There’s a bit of complication in the fact that many
of the cited creed-like statements don’t come right out and call those who
don’t ascribe to their central tenets sinners.
For example in the Statement of
Confession and Commitment there is little doubt that any Trump supporting
or closed border supporter is a sinner someway.
But they don’t come right out and say this. Other cited movements do (if you don’t
support intersectionality and acknowledge your privilege you’re a racist). I think my brother reference Derrida’s “Force
of Law” work for his understanding of this general issue.
What we have is a bifurcation point. Formalized belief statements don’t cause the
viewing of out-groups as sinners. Such
direct causation is farcical. But the
trend to formalized belief statements with explicit morality in zones where few
hitherto existed does change the cultural-evolutionary landscape.
The main cultural tools you use in this regard are:
- horizontal transfer
- oblique transfer
- prestige bias
- content bias
- conformity
Each has a different growth curve, which is
unfortunately beyond my time to analyze with respect to the evolution of
formalized-belief-statement based groups.
Explicitness enables high fidelity copying. Memetic fitness is optimized with a
sprinkling of slightly counter-intuitive beliefs. This also resonates with the characteristics
associated with adaptive group formation (costly commitment displays,
hard-to-fake beliefs/actions, norm detection & policing). This gives us two things to look for: 1) what
cultural transmission resonates with high fidelity copying and 2) what beliefs
statements are memetically fit in their formalized state?
According to Mesoudi’s interpretation of Boyd &
Richerson,
Guided variation is where people
individually modify acquired cultural traits according to their own individual
learning biases. Content biases, like
other forms of cultural selection, occur when people preferentially choose
among existing traits found in the population without changing those traits. Guided variation is an individual process,
content bias is a population process
So if the interpretational range of formalized
belief statements is loose and it is used to move up levels of selection, then
guided variation is a possibility and log-like expansion should be
expected. But the fidelity of tightly
written belief statements suggests a content bias. The question then becomes about conformity
levels.
Group-to individual feedback mechanisms are
examples of conformity biases.
Group-to-individual feedback in morally impregnated landscapes is well
studied and is significant. One you
become part of a group and make a commitment as simply as signing a statement,
the probability of expressing group-to-individual feedback increases
significantly.
Prestige is also a powerful conforming bias. Prestige bias involves mimicking observed
behaviours of successful individuals (i.e. buying the same shoes as Michael
Jordan). As per Mesoudi
(pp. 74-75)
Boyd and Richerson constructed
models to explore this intuition more formally.
They confirmed that a general prestige bias is indeed a good way of
acquiring adaptive behavior compared to individual learning and unbiased
transmission (random copying). However,
this depends on the extent to which indicator of success correlate with the
traits that are copied.
Other experiments support Boyd and
Richerson’s specific prediction that prestige bias is broad and not necessarily
always adaptive.
Prestige bias can also lead to a
runaway “arms race” between the markers of prestige and the copied traits. To illustrate this, Boyd and Richerson drew
an analogy with sexual selection in biological evolution.
Perhaps one of the most informative articles is The
Herding Behaviour in Heterogeneous Populations. Here’s the abstract.
Here we study the emergence of spontaneous
leadership in large populations. In standard models of opinion dynamics,
herding behavior is only obeyed at the local scale due to the interaction of
single agents with their neighbors; while at the global scale, such models are
governed by purely diffusive processes. Surprisingly, in this paper we show
that the combination of a strong separation of time scales within the
population and a hierarchical organization of the influences of some agents on
the others induces a phase transition between a purely diffusive phase, as in
the standard case, and a herding phase where a fraction of the agents
self-organize and lead the global opinion of the whole population
Another relevant work is the Emergence of Echo Chambers
in Mobile Agent Scenarios
Multi-agent models often describe populations segregated
either in the physical space, i.e. subdivided in metapopulations, or in the
ecology of opinions, i.e. partitioned in echo chambers. Here we show how both
kinds of segregation can emerge from the interplay between homophily and social
influence in a simple model of mobile agents endowed with a continuous opinion
variable. In the model, physical proximity determines a progressive convergence
of opinions but differing opinions result in agents moving away from each
others. This feedback between mobility and social dynamics determines the onset
of a stable dynamical metapopulation scenario where physically separated groups
of like-minded individuals interact with each other through the exchange of
agents. The further introduction of confirmation bias in social interactions,
defined as the tendency of an individual to favor opinions that match his own,
leads to the emergence of echo chambers where different opinions coexist also
within the same group.
So formalization sews the seeds of hierarchy (the
original draftees are high status, as are early adopters and high commitment expressers). It also facilitates content bias plus conformity
growth curves (people can pick which creed to sign, but once they do they are
biased by in-group dynamics). These growth
curves clearly have the dynamics associated with cultural phase changes.
Summarizing
Formalized belief statements are subject to
gene-culture co-evolutionary forces.
Cultural selection resonates with genetic dispositions. In large populations random walk drifts
ensure all cultural pathways are expressed.
Those that are most fit (genetically and culturally) are of the most
interest. Groups which express adaptive
group traits are selected for under conditions of weak and strong between-group
selection. It is hard not to see current
political and social turmoil as anything other than a case of mounting group
selection pressure.
Academic belief statements with strong moral
components have a probabilistic chance of resonating with individuals who will leverage
them adaptively. Explicit moral
statements facilitate this process. Such
statements enable in-group out group gradients.
Are they simple statement of belief?
Yes, and no. As soon as it
becomes a group enterprise group dynamics ensue.
Between
Group Competition
Coming in another part***….
NOTES
* Remember, evolutionary transitions require:
1 in-group
conflict suppression mechanism - belief formalization enables
this by delineating belief lines enabling clear distinctions between in-group
and out-groups. (and no, it doesn't just minimize in-group conflict by defining
away anyone in conflict as an out-group....)
2 coordination - the
morality (implied or overt) of belief statements aids this
3 extreme
dependency - belief statement facilitate this only in as much
as they facilitate the creation of adaptive groups (other signatories have your
back). But extreme dependency is very unlikely except in momentary times
of severe selection pressure (such as violent schisms).
** Note: a directional arrow does not imply a Fukuyama
“end to history” nor any kind of directed process. It especially does not imply a stage-based
theory to societal evolution. The
default hypothesis for any evolutionary process is drift. In some environments smaller groups are more
fit. In other environments they are
not. What you see is expression of both
phenotypical tails. Migration (tied to
within-group competition) and between-group competition play important roles in
selecting whether or not the tails are or are not cut off. Tribal sized groups who are unable to
coordinate with others as needed are certainly much less dominant than the were
10,000 years ago. So the default
hypothesis is drift with selection pressure against uncoordinatable small
groups. A number of authors take a
stronger stance and suggest that war is in fact an active selector for large
groups. While I personally favour the
active selection stance, for this argument the weaker drift hypothesis
suffices.
*** This particular instance of group competition
has some tangential connection to social media swarm politics I talked about last year
(not that it is causative in a one-to-one way, but rather that it facilitates a
landscape which produces such dynamics under the right conditions)
And perhaps relevant to this discussion
ReplyDeletehttp://www.psych.nyu.edu/jost/Missing%20in%20Collective%20Action.pdf