Comparing Group Levels - Thinking Out Loud

In the spirit of the new year, I suppose it's about time to sum up some of the more rigorous approaches to group (level) formation. Here are the major disciplines I've been studying:

• Sociology via Keith Sawyer
• Economics via List & Pettit
• Biology via Okasha & Wilson

and

• Social Psychology via Haidt
• Science of Religion via Norenzayan & Atran
• Cultural Evolution via Turchin

Caveat:  This post is mostly a chance for me to work out-loud through the uncertain process of categorization.  My intent is to see if there is any way to piece together insights from the various traditions in order to

To start the thinking process, here's a cursory summary of the various approaches to multiple-group levels.

	Process (Interaction) Sociology	Structural Sociology	Rational Choice Economics	Multi-Level Selection Biology
Time scale	varies (duration determines group level)	medium (long enough for structure to solidify & produce readily observable feedback effects)	short (a couple of judgments)	generations
Measure	observation of communication artifacts	structure's level of control over individual	group agent  rationality & supercedence of indiv. rationality	fitness
Loose Philo tradition	communication theory & process philosophy	social constructivism	rational reductionism	positivism?
Determinant of Group level	duration of group or artefacts produced by interaction within group	causative power dynamics (with top-down bias)	supercedence of rationality to higher level (causative power dynamics)	covariant fitness

Based on this summary, how one deals with the nesting of groups seems like an interesting line of investigation.  Here's my first crack at categorizing nesting approaches.

GROUP NESTING METHODS

• By Group Size - While it might seem obvious that a higher level group necessarily has more members than a lower level one, this doesn't have to be the case.  Take for instance an authoritarian government.  It might control a very large population, but outside of a few sycophants there may be few agents who identify as part of the group. However, there may be many people who consider themselves part of the same nation's social institution, say education, a social movement or the nation's soccer fanatics.  These groups may be subservient to the larger group, but contain more members than the large group. Thus group size nesting is at odds with power relation nesting.
• By Control - Control is easiest to visualize and model when it acts on adjacent group levels.  However, in practice, feedback is likely to be complicated and occur between non-adjacent levels. Multi-level selection theory certainly accepts this postulate.  Utility of non-adjacent group interaction is determined by fitness covariance. This measurement oriented approach avoids some of the conundrums that comes with sociology's functional oriented approaches.
• Control by threshold level - if control from a group passes a certain threshold (probably low)  then a higher group is needed.  This type of control creates possible nesting problems.  A low level group has the theoretical possibility of controlling a high level group.  For instance, a particular team of soccer fanatics may theoretically control an authoritarian government even though they may be nested a couple of levels below the government (group of fans -> a team's fans -> soccer team -> sports body -> government)
• Control by net level of feedback - the level that has the most control supercedes the other.  This sets the stage for chicken & egg priority problems - whose feedback comes first.  I suspect this is part of the intractable micro vs. macro paradigm problem
• By Emergence - a higher level group is produced whenever emergent properties can't be be reduced down to the level of its agents. Complicated, non-adjacent nesting problems are possible. For instance, what happens when you have an emergent group entity functioning as part of another group of individual people?  Minimizing this would seem to require assuming groups rarely act as agents within the same level as individuals or pushing group effects back onto individuals.  The former, though plausible, seems rather arbitrary.  The latter takes you back to the reductionist problems of methodological individualism.

Perhaps a better way to categorize nesting methods is as follows:

• principle based methods - control, group size, other subjective lenses, & perhaps emergence
• covariance methods - fitness, & perhaps some narrow quantifiable subjective measures
• property methods - emergence 

BEGGING THE NESTING QUESTION

However this still begs the question of how to minimize overlapping within nested groups.  

Principle based methods seem to rely on the quality of used lenses.  Lens quality seems based on a hope that qualitative research can reveal accurate descriptors and researcher bias can be minimized by rigorous reflexive practice.  That type of stamp collecting has never interested me much. Bootstrapping doesn't wiggle my toes.

I like covariant methods.  They seem able to reveal the extent to which overlapping nests are or are not a factor.  They also seem better at minimizing subjective bias than principle methods . The timeframe of analysis seems problematic though.  How do you measure fitness for human groups that may produce counter-fitness results on a short time scale (say rich people having few kids), but increase fitness over long time scales (say rich people after a couple famines)?

Property methods seem intriguing.  However, emergent properties seem problematic to deduce.  List & Pettit have probably done the most work here (that I know of).  Their approach is based on deducing group-agent rationality. However, their rationality test seems overly cognitive.

Another way to minimize nesting overlaps is to only include certain types of groups.  List & Pettit have done this with their rational actor approach: only rational groups count.  Multi-level selection has indirectly done this due to the timescales inherit in its modelling.  (One gets around the timescale issue a bit by being able to look at whether genes present in some populations and not others correlate with historical fitness differences.)  Similarly, Sawyer suggest structural sociologists have created very narrow definitions for their group levels. However, by whittling down the focus on individual interaction they have challenges explaining the emergence of the structure they take for granted (Sawyer, 2013): Structure is what is socially stable.

Sawyer's sociological Emergence paradigm broadens standard sociological group levels.  He adds a couple of group levels based upon time stability.  This is done from a communicative tradition.  It includes the following levels:

1. Structure - written texts like laws, infrastructure
2. Stable emergents - group subcultures, group slang, collective memory, shared social practices
3. Ephemeral emergents - topic, relative roles, status assignments
4. Interaction - discourse patterns, collaboration
5. Individual - personality, cognitive processes, agency

Unfortunately he isn't explicit in mentioning the role of time.  Ephemeral's differ from stables only in terms of their survivability.  This backward looking approach isn't ideal.  What non-arbitrary and non-subjective measures could you use to accurately distinguish ephemerals from stables?  Subjective rates of change?  Arbitrary time scales that disregard context?  Subjective time scales that are sensitive to context? Having some characteristics of what likely correlates with survivability would be nice.

For instance, the science of religion via Atran has postulated a number of markers associated with stable group functioning.  If one trusts Norenzayan's conclusion that religion is an evolutionary adaptive group structure, then one can start to pick away at the markers correlated with adaptive groups at any level.  This mirrors List & Pettit's rational approach.  However, instead of just postulating two markers:

1. rationality via truth orientation & independent judgment, and 
2. group decision supravenience (i.e group control over the individual),

one would posit several markers such as:

1. freeloader detection & punishment
2. costly commitment displays
3. moral "Big Brother"
4. deference to group norms
5. sacred values & norms
6. assessment of individuals based upon their inferred intents
7. quasi-propositional truths (rationalization of cognitive dissonance)
8. etc.

The marker approach may represent another way of looking at emergents.  Instead of taking the standard approach by defining emergence as that which produces something novel from its constituents, the marker approach stipulates which emergent properties are acceptable (based upon their likeliness).  However, this greatly reduces scalability and limits the approach to a certain region of group levels.

TIME CRUSHES ALL

While I'm partial to the science of religion's marker approach, how do you measure any of that!  What seems to be coming out of this open-thinking process is the glossed over role of time.

From Sawyer (2013),

Most sociological discussion of emergence have focused on the broader macrostructures that emerge and how those emergent patterns constrain future interaction.  Yet these studies have not had much success in tracing the exact details of the moment-to-moment emergence processes whereby macrostructures are collectively created.  In contrast, the Interaction Paradigm has focused exactly on the moment-to-moment details of how ephemeral emergents result from interaction.  However, in shifting their focus to interactional process, they have tended to neglect the nature of what emerges and of what perdures across repeated encounters. (pp. 215)

Biology indirectly tackles the time issue with its adoption of a non-socially constructed fitness measure.  This enables covariant study. Instead of finding the historical record associated with a certain gene, you can just investigate populations that do and don't have it, looking at their fitness over time. Thus you get control groups.

FORMING A CONCLUSION

The following points seem to emerge from this discussion:

• narrow down the definition of "group" which is used to produce group-levels
• instead of using arbitrary definitions to limit "groups", use an objective measure
• pick a workable time frame for that measure's collection
• pick a measure that naturally facilitates finding control groups
• pick a measure whose collection is binary (like fitness)
• ensure the measure scales up and down
• I like science of religion markers

So, to me, it boils down to finding the most objective measure possible that catches the insights gleaned from the science of religion marker analyses.  Why?  Because I assume very wise people, especially those in sociology, have already thought hard about the standard ways of putting these points together.

OPTIONS

Options seem to be:

• create an aggregate measure of "adaptiveness" based upon previously observed markers
• follow a hybrid social interactionist path and, in terms of group levels, just talk about increasing, decreasing or very stable structures (on an arbitrarily long time)
• keep plugging away to find a novel measure construct.

Competing Superveniences

List & Pettit's arguments in Group Agency are well structured and transparent to follow.  One of their theorems is that holistic supervenience is consistent with robust group rationality (pp. 69).  In simpler terms this means that a group which rationalizes things generally can't make judgements in a piece-wise fashion.  The group's judgments must supercede individual judgements.  For things on which the group speaks, everyone must listen.

Image from http://www.gopixpic.com

Now if this is the case, then how can education hold competing purposes? For example, how can education vacillate between a focus on things like social equality and a focus on things like the selective academic streamlining*?  Within List & Pettit's logical structure, education can't have a logical split personality.

The following options emerge; well at least they emerge from my deduction.

CLOSE CALLS
Social equity & streamlined academics must produce close judgment calls for dominance.  Ebb and flow of group members and environmental factors may cause one or the other to rise or fall in predominance.

The problem with this position is that cultural evolution suggests a fairly strong selection gradient.

The reason is simple: cognitive attractors will rapidly concentrate the cultural variation in a population. Instead of a continuum of cultural variants, most people will hold a representation near an attractor. If there is only one attractor, it will dominate. However, if, as seems likely in most cases, attactors are many, other selective forces will then act to increase the frequency of people holding a representation near one attractor over others. Under such conditions, even weak selective forces (“weak” relative to the strength of the attractors) can determine the final distribution of representations in the population. (Henrich, Boyd, Richerson, 2008)

Thus, one shouldn't really expect to see a long-lasting tension without a fairly explicit organizational structure facilitating the competing memes.

MUTLI-LEVEL GROUPINGS
Another option explaining durability of two competing judgment conclusions for a List & Pettit group agent is that individuals form multiple groups, each with their own supervening judgment conclusion.

This fits in incredibly well with multi-level selection theory.  Rather than the aggregate of individual judgments producing competing group conclusions, it is competition between competing holistic superveniences which produce education's competing purposes.  Thus group allegiance tensions most inform education's competing purposes.


PREMISE BASED CHANGE
Another way you could get two competing judgment conclusions would be to vacillate between premise based judgment aggregator functions.  Put in simpler terms, you change the logic used to take premises to conclusions.

This would seem highly likely to produce more than two stable states.  Now its entirely possible that educational purpose vacillates between more than two states.  While this is true when analyzing things with a precise sense, educational change history really does seem to reveal a pattern of cycling between large group orientation and local group orientations.  While premise function aggregators may only produce two stable outputs, I'll rely on a simple probabilistic argument that this is highly unlikely given the number of premises operating within education.  However, I'll certainly concede that a two state output based on a complex function is theoretically possible.


SPECIALIZED GROUPS
List & Pettit also mention another way that could explain a scenario of competing purposes.   Conclusions formed by specialized groups dictate all individual attitudes on a given issue.  This places the group agent in the role of rationalizing multiple conclusions.  Rationalization occurs by the laity's formation of a supervening holistic conclusion.  However, a quote seems to baffle this last idea, so I must be missing something:

First for each presumes, the attitudes of some subgroup - the relevant 'specialists - suffice to determine the group attitude on that premise, whereas other individuals' attitudes are not necessary; and the subgroups in question differ across premises.  Second, to determine the group attitudes on the entire agenda of propositions, each individual needs to contribute only a single attitude on a single proposition, namely on the premise he or she 'specializes' on; no contribution on other propositions is needed. (pp. 75)

The statement as written begs the question of formation of a single supra conclusion.  I don't think they would leave this to mysterious "emergentism".  Nor do I think they are unaware of the aggregation problem the quote as written begs.  Therefore, the only thing I can think of is that the gross laity also form a single conclusion for the group agent.  This single conlcusion then has the role of rationalization potentially contradictory multiple specialist conclusions.  It doesn't over-write them, but "vox-splains" them into a coherent narrative.  This narrative is certainly may be logically inconsistent.

However, List & Pettit seem to leave the rationalization act as a very weak form of emergence:

Let a collection of individuals form and act on a single, robustly rational body of attitudes, whether by dint of a joint intention or on some other bases, and it will be an agent. (pp. 75)

As I mentioned, joint intention seems to be the supra conclusion of the laity.  This either minimizes (if the group's conclusion is an attitude) or completely eliminates emergence (if the group's conclusion is an agreed upon structure, or perhaps even an attitudinaless action).  In practice, you end up with specialized groups getting feedback from the group's supra conclusion in a manner potentially describe by social-cognitive theory.

I'd suggest the specialized group explanation is tatamount to my multi-level group explanation.  Difference seems to be the extent to which sub-groups are best considered embedded within the larger group or competing with the larger group.  List & Pettit's specialized group approach seems unstable over time.  If people have a tendency to form groups, then there is little reason why that tendency wouldn't express itself in the autonomization and dissociation of small groups from a large group.

Cognitive dissonance theory may be used as a descriptive approach to when embodies ends and competition begins.  Because I'm more interested in the causal side than descriptive side, cognitive dissonance explanations don't excite me much.  I just chalk it up to "that's down to complex behaviour....".



*While lots of people do mental gymnastics to reconcile how social equity, ensuring people don't get too far apart from each other, and academic streaming, ensuring people get as much acceleration as they can easily be handled, the two are pretty mutually exclusive.  Weak social equity can certainly handle a bit of streamlining.  However, because the have's get accelerated more than the have-nots, the end results reveal the weakness of this cover-up. Addressing student needs at the non-universal level will (eventually) always produce streamlining which challenges social equity.

The Cultural Evolution Piece

This summary of a paper by Henrich, Boyd, and Richardson is exactly what I needed.

Image from http://photos.demandstudios.com

While I have yet jumped very far into the cultural evolution literature, its a piece that is needed to support how (institutionalized) education functions as an adaptive group.

MODEL SUMMARY

My basic model posits tension in education between group-level orientation and individual-level (or more precisely, smaller group) orientation.  It also posits a slight preference for toleration.  Toleration preference orients the system to group-level inclusivity (i.e. toward a universalist moral position).  This fosters low frequency but sudden phase changes.  Reform resistance emerges due to the weak-to-moderate moral nature of the group.  Reform resistance is therefore governed by the various social factors associated with adaptive groups (i.e. norm variation detection & punishment, costly commitment displays, moral big brother, etc.).

I'm still playing with the notion of whether the end points of large group-orientation and small group-orientation are or are not strange attractors.

CULTURAL EVOLUTION CONNECTION

That's why this quote from Henrich, Boyd and Richardson is so interesting:

[C]ultural transmission does not involve the accurate replication of discrete, gene-like entities. Nonetheless, we also believe that models which assume discrete replicators that evolve under the influence of natural- selection-like forces can be useful. In fact, we think such models are useful because of the action of strong cognitive attractors during the social learning. 

The reason is simple: cognitive attractors will rapidly concentrate the cultural variation in a population. Instead of a continuum of cultural variants, most people will hold a representation near an attractor. If there is only one attractor, it will dominate. However, if, as seems likely in most cases, attactors are many, other selective forces will then act to increase the frequency of people holding a representation near one attractor over others. Under such conditions, even weak selective forces (“weak” relative to the strength of the attractors) can determine the final distribution of representations in the population.

Furthermore, the summary of their position by carcinisation.com is at least as interesting.

A major feature of cognitive attractors is that particulate cognitive information is less costly to hold and transmit than blended information - for example, it's easier to model the moon as either purely a rock in space or purely a conscious entity than some combination of the two.

Education's social equality camp is a cultural attractive well.  Education's academic/contextualized-needs camp is another cultural attractive well.  Intractability in premise or conclusion judgment prevent a stable solution.

Now whether the end-points are or are not strange attractors is a hard question.  Dynamics could be due to the attractors or due to the environment which the attractors lay (i.e. the judgment process).

Application Test

Over the summer my education reform resistance ground-work seems to have settled down.  At least to me, its seems seems to have come together as a larger framework that I was expecting.  In fact, it is probably best articulated as a full fledged theory: Education as an adaptive group. While there is lots more work to get it constructed as a theory, perhaps it's time to test what utility the dynamical model associated with this idea has….

The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) recently posted a regression of innovation in education system innovation vs. 8th grade math teacher satisfaction.  The results show a moderately strong positive correlation.  A conclusion is that teachers are more satisfied when education systems innovate more.

SITUATING THE TEST CASE

This research fits with Bogler's (2001) finding that teacher prefer to work with a leader that exhibits transformational behaviour rather than transactional behaviour.  It also fits in with miscellaneous research on human preference for novelty, which certainly seems to be an evolutionary selected trait.  Of interest to me, the OECD finding also fits, tangentially, with Sigmund's & Nowak's (2001) simulation which shows minor preference for tolerance among individuals leads to increasing levels of tolerance leading to cyclical transitions to extreme intolerance.  Of course, to apply Sigmund's work you have to make a rather large leap in assuming increased tolerance also means increased novelty/innovation.  Such a leap is fine for armchair bloggers, but certainly isn't academically sound.  Nonetheless, it seems like the OECD finding is well supported by what I know (but haven't cited) of evolutionary cognitive science research, educational leadership research and teacher preference research.

RE-CAPPING BIG IDEAS

Education as an adaptive group theory (or the current nascent underpinnings of this potential theory) suggests the institution of education, and those who are considered members of this group, are dynamically torn due to competition of between-group (group) selection and its proximate causes and within-group (individual) selection and its proximate causes.  Weak dominance of one factor over another creates instability (Okasha, 2009) while strong dominance creates stasis.

An adaptive group, such as institutionalized education in rule of law states, is subject to moralization selection. This includes things associated with freeloader detection, norm variation punishment, and transcendental moralization (Atran, 2002; Wilson 2002; Norenzayan 2013; Haidt 2013).  Institutionalized education is a moderate moralized group.

A functionalist interpretation of the education-as-an-adaptive group model postulates a variety of different attractor descriptions for the group end state and for the individual end state.  Each pair of descriptors should be complimentary (i.e. tolerance & intolerance would pair as a dyad, but curiosity & power would not).  Education functions, amongst other things, as a societal coherer that provides significant fitness benefits for its constituents.

A non-functionalist interpretation of the education-as-an-adaptive group model postulates tension between group processes and individual processes.

In both the functionalist and non-functionalist interpretation, group processes/states dominate weakly.  Continued group expansion or maintenance of large group stature leads to increased heterogeneity. This can be envisioned a the rise of individual processes (non-functionalist interpretation) or attraction to the individual state (functionalist interpretation).  This eventually challenges adaptive group function.  A phase change occurs to a homogeneous state/process (adaptive group state).  The cycle repeats.

Education's competitive relationships are fairly stable in scope: its sphere of influence is not rapidly changing.  Group competitors may include such things as homeschooling, private tutor based education, non-institutionalized religious education, religion, some radical outcome-based charter schools, and perhaps political groups.  K-12 competitors differ from post-secondary competitors.

VALIDATIONS

Relevant to the OECD report correlating increased innovation with increased teacher satisfaction, education as an adaptive group theory accurately predicts findings.

1. Teacher preference for innovation - Homogeneity of the group state is unstable.  Individual process &/or sub-group splintering rises complexly.  Processes that facilitate individualization should be favoured.  Education's moderate moralizing characteristic minimizes the degree to which it favours extreme conservatism.  Education has just the right degree of freedom to facilitate innovation but prevent group implosion.
2. Education is near or slightly above the average innovation levels of other professional sectors - Institutionalized education has functioned as an adaptive group for 150 years (since the emergence of popular public education).  Education's moderate moralizing characteristic minimizes the degree to which it favours extreme conservatism or extreme progressivism.  Education has just the right degree of freedom to facilitate innovation but prevent group implosion.  

PREDICTIONS

Here are a few predictors I came up with which can't be verified from the data.

1. 50 year period for innovation preferences - Education as an adaptive group model predicts that teacher preferences for innovation should wax and wane with a major period of 50 years.  Every 50 years one should see a spike in in-tolerance toward divergent practice.  A correlated decrease in innovation preference is likely.
2. Minor (complex) cycling - Within each country, one should expect to see minor cycling between high and low levels of innovation preference.  Tension between group state and individual state produce complex dynamics.  Greater dominance of group processes or individual processes should produce more stable dynamics.
3. High moralization facilitates divergence or extreme conservancy - As the severity of education's moralizing character increases one may tend to expect either a shift to extreme conservancy (i.e. religious like behaviour), or the ability to function with increased levels of divergence (i.e. the moral mission is strong enough to unite disparate individuals).  
4. No moralization leads to unsustainability - As eduction's moralizing character vanishes one may expect to see education not function as an adaptive group (i.e. degrees and accreditation may have little value). One may also see unsustainable institutionalized operation at the group level (i.e. lots of total reforms & co-optation of purpose).

CONCLUSION

The main finding of the OECD piece, preference for innovation, seem to weakly validate education as an adaptive group theory.  However, there is a fair bit of 'handwaving' involved.  Functionalistic argumentation is very weak. While I've been trying to stay out of the functionalistic trap, it seems likely I'll get caught in it in order to explain why the group operates with a background bias for toleration/innovation.

Sigmund's work shows a slight preference for toleration leads to the cyclical dynamics observed in education.  Wilson's (and others) recent work on altruism will likely provide some ammunition supporting minor preference for inclusivity/tolerance.  However, more work is obviously needed to show that education doesn't function in a highly competitive environment, and thus doesn't require tight norm detection and punishment.  I suspect some of the work on the emergence of universalizing religion would be quite informative here.  For example, Beneke's book on the origins of American pluralism is likely to be quite good.

Additional work on education's role as a large group is needed.  For example, does a large group role require universalizing tendencies such as slight preference for innovation, divergence and tolerance?  Again, this seems to be a likely draw into functionalism.

REFERENCES

• Atran, S.  (2002).  In Gods We Trust: The Evolutionary Landscape of Religion.  Oxford Press.
• Bogler, R.  (2001).  The influence of leadership style on teacher job satisfaction.  Educational Administration Quarterly, 37, 662-683.
• Haidt, J.  (2013).  The Righteous Mind:  Why Good People are Divided by Politics and Religion.  Vintage.
• Leach, C., Zebel, s., Vliek, L, Pennekamp, S., Doosje, B., Zomeren, M. Ouwerkerk, J., Spears, R. (2008).  Group-Level Self-Definition and Self-Investment: A Hierarchical (Mulitcomponent) Model of In-Group Identification.  Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,  95 (1), 144-165.
• Norenzayan, A.  (2013).  Big Gods.  How Religion Transformed Cooperation and Conflict.  Princeton University Press.
• OECD (2014).  Measuring Innovation in Education: A New Perspective, Educational Research and Innovation, OECD Publishing.  Retrieved August 20, 2014 from here.
• Okasha, S. (2009).  Evolution and the Levels of Selection.  Oxford.
• Sigmund, K., Nowak, M. (2001).  Tides of Tolerance.  Nature, 414, 403.
• Wilson, D. (2002).  Darwin's Cathedral: Evolution, Religion and the Nature of Society. University of Chicago. 

Late night thoughts on multi-level selection theory

I was just re-reading D.S. Wilson's old paper on Multi-level selection theory's implications for psychology.  In relation to education reform resistance, it stirred up a few old thoughts and a few new ones:

• if our institutionalized education system functions as an adaptive group, according to Wilson, for between group selection to occur it must be competing against some other group or lone individuals.  The only real contenders for competitors are homeschoolers, non-schoolers, radical charter schoolers, and, if the medium hadn't been so hybridized perhaps some online schoolers. This leads to some rather interesting investigations.

Multi-level Selection Theory & Process Philosophy

I love the insight multi-level selection theory offers educational change theory.  Here's one reason why.

Sociology has a long history of struggling with the micro-macro problem. The micro-macro problem tackles transitions between individual properties/behaviours and group properties/behaviours.  During the founding of formal sociology, Durkheim was quite adamant about not trying to reduce the group level (sociology) to the individual level (psychology).  Academics who have tried to bridge these disparate levels have not been successful.  Both the "why" and "how" of cross over remain intractable. (See Sawyer's amazing book on Complex Sociology for solid history applicable to any study involving human dynamics)

Multi-level selection theory avoids the "why" and "how" of micro-macro cross over by taking a ground up reductionist approach leveraging gene fitness/presence as a unit of measure.  In terms of my chosen problem of educational reform resistance, mimicking this strategy makes for a rather elegant and parsimonious approach.  Ignore explanatory reasons for reform resistance by positing some form of dyadic tension (multi-level tension).  A specific dyadic tension will yield a characteristic dynamic curve.  Agent based modelling or equation based modelling filters reasonable dyadic choices based upon observed education reform data. The crux involves finding the right unit of measure.

Such an approach belies a number of philosophical and theoretical assumptions.  Off the top of my head, I can see having to worry about:

• reductionist vs. non-reductionist theoretical approaches
• operationalizing a micro-macro dynamic
• tackling or avoiding driving forces (i.e. functionalism or ant-functionalism)
• an insightful level of analysis (i.e. large group, small group, individual, genes, etc.)
• the proper unit of measure (i.e. large group, small group, individual, genes, etc.)

For this post, I'll mainly stick to thinking about operationalizing a micro-macro dynamic.  I'll see how such an operationalizing fits with the other points of worry.

OPERATIONALIZING MULTI-LEVEL SELECTION THEORY

In multi-level selection theory the group and the individual exist in dynamic tension.  Sometimes fitness is increased with more groupish behaviour, sometimes fitness is increased with more individualistic behaviour. If I were a sociologist, I'd be very tempted to think of social behaviour as an emergent property of this dynamic tension.  However, my academic interest involves seeing whether or not this class of dyadic relation can adequately characterize educational reform resistance physics.

As I've thought about multi-level section theory (image on the left), I've been trying to figure out if "group" & "individual" best represent strange attractors (a complexity approach) or boundary characterizations (a process philosophy approach).  Conformity with reductionist or non-reductionist philosophical stances are impacted by such operationalization.

STRANGE ATTRACTORS or BOUNDARY LABELS

Strange Attractors
A strange attractor operationalization of multi-level selection theory seems like a good fit for interpretation at the level of the individual.

Individuals may be attracted (in a self-interested way) to group participation.  They may also be attracted to narrow (direct) individual self-interest.  In non-funcationalist evolutionary language, do you increase your fitness by constraining immediate self-interest to group norms or not. The individual effect is complex cycling between group orientation and individual orientation.  The interaction of multiple individuals undergoing such tension should produce, in a complex way, emergent social phenomenon.

However, modelling of ed reform resistance as dynamic tension between groupish and individualistic attractors may be unwise.  What is the attraction acting on? Individuals? Groups? Genes? Behaviours? Picking a level of attraction walks you right into the micro-macro problem.  This seems messy and does not fit well with multi-level selection theory*1.


Boundary Labels
Analyzing things in terms of the group leads me to interpret "group" & "individual" as end states/boundary labels. A confluence of groupish processes would suggest I'm in the group state (for a particular aspect of analysis).  A confluence of individualish processes would suggest I'm in the individual state.  In this sense neither "group" nor "individual" are attractors.  They simply represent rough characterizations imposed by the role of an interpreter.

Process philosophy is well suited for non-reductionist questions where we don't really care why you're in a given state, only that such a descriptor is reasonably apt.  Process resists reductionist impetus to drill down. In a process sense, sufficiently complicated underlying dynamics produce multiple competing processes whose aggregate results vary in time.  We don't care what those underlying dynamics are, just that they fit observed characterizations for the time scale of study.  For example, emergent social phenomenon are the result of various combinations of group processes and individual processes. This amalgam is better characterized as social phenomena rather than specific combinations of group states / individual states.

A process approach is a non-reducationist strategy that avoids questions of driving forces.  This comes at the expense of expense of rationalizable/reductionist explanatory power.


THE CRUX
Multi-level selection theory seems to have avoided the conundrum of process & reductionism by finding an unambiguous unit of measure (the gene).  Cognitive scientists studying the science of religion seem to have done similar things by finding invariant heuristics (darwin machines as some call them) expressed or not expressed in religious vs. a-religious populations. Is a dynamical study of education reform resistance destined for the the cognitive science heuristic approach?  Probably, but for the moment I'm content to find some plausible physics that constrain the problem.




NOTES
*1.   Multi-level selection is a non-functionlist theory.  As such, it does not frame things in terms of attractors.  This assumes intent, and D.S. Wilson, the creator of multi-level selection theory, isn't philosophically naive.  Genes are not "attracted" to groupish states or non-groupish states.  They are mind-blind.  Operationally, genes serve as a unit of measure: is a specific gene present/expressed or not.  Different levels can be analyzed, but any level reduces down to the genes.

When exploring functionalistic forces for individual-ishness vs. group-ishness the chances are pretty good that you'll wind up in cognitive psychology or evolutionary psychology land looking for cognitive preference and tendencies.  While this landscape is really, really interesting, I suspect you'll wind up doing cognitive science work for a lot of necessary but not sufficient causes.  You may even be tempted to do some agent modelling to filter plausible causes based upon observed dynamical properties.  Like I say, this sounds pretty fun.  The results, like those emerging from the cognitive sci and evolutionary psych folks doing science of religion work, may even be groundbreaking. However, it just seems like stamp collecting to me…

In his foundational book "In God's we Trust", Scott Atran outlines a bunch of cognitive preferences and heuristics which lead to religious group formation and religious beliefs.

The Freeloader Punishment Problem in Education-as-an-adaptive-group Theory

If a societal level group, like the institution of education, functions as an adaptive group, then multi-level selection theory suggests adequate freeloader detection and punishment is required for long-term group survival/coherence.

While it is unlikely that education is a strong grouping (compared to religion, political party, family, etc.), I certainly take the view, that the institution of education functions at the level of an adaptive group.  As such it is subject to:

• cultural evolution,
• individual vs. group strange attractor dynamics, 
• group maintenance processes (at the proximate cause level) and 
• complex growth/decay dynamics.

Because the institution of education has survived remarkably well as a societal level group, examining possible ways the freeloader problem is handled is important.  

SHADOW SYSTEM CONTEXT

Without freeloader detection and punishment, one would expect to see swamping by disruptive shadow systems.  On this point a few facts provide context.

• For the last 150 to 200 years education tends to follow a 50 year disruptive (phase change) cycle (Tyack & Cuban, 1995).
• Despite clear phase changes every 50 years or so, education's coherence with larger societal shifts and limited population focus (ages 5-25) minimize the severity with which the general population perceives major disruptions (Tyack & Cuban, 1995).  In other words, the growing bifurcation is only noticed by a few 'long-in-the-tooth' teachers who've had feet in both paradigms.
• Charter schools, online/blended schools, and home schools represent significant shadow systems to education's traditional institutionalization (Christensen, 2014; Basham, 2001; Bielect, Changler, Broughman, 2002).
• Teacher regulation is a perennial issue in North America.

My reading and perspectives here seem to mirror Larry Cuban's: education has a significant tendency to hybridize reforms.  Other institutions like various religious denominations and moral based social groups rarely hybridize their splinter groups.

Off-the-cuff thinking suggests many religious denominations and moral based social group tend toward balkanization.  One plausible explanation for balkanization and splinter-group vs. main group competition is a steep gradient for norm variation punishment.  In other words, you leave a religion or moral social group with a fair bit of momentum.  i.e you're punted out the door.

Education seems to have a softer gradient for norm variants.  While you can still get punted out, there seems to be significant liberalness with regard to orthodoxy and certainly tremendous tolerance with regard to orthopraxy.  This suggests adaptive level groups such as religion and moral based social groups have stronger 'freeloader' punishment tendencies than education (as an adaptive level institutionalized group does).  Why?

EDUCATION'S WEAK FREELOADER / NORM VARIATION PUNISHMENT

Universalist religions tend to have well developed systems to teach and encourage norm compliance.  Often a hard-to-fake show of intent submission is a good enough group entry point (Evangelicals = public redeemer confessions, Mormon = gaining a testimony, etc.).  Novel offshoot splinter groups tend to be much more concerned about current, rather than future, norm adherence.

I've already done a bit of speculation about norm variation punishment in education (online courses  & homeschooling ). For a more grounded perspective, Izhak Berkovich's research on teacher reform resistance in the 64 day 2007 Israeli teacher strike.  His work reveals teacher attempts to combat  the 'freeloader' perception problem.

This attempt to undermine the public’s perception of teachers as "freeloaders" enjoying public funds for little work was found to be a central theme in teachers' rational appeals. (pp. 13)

 Analysis also reveals teacher attempts to frame 'freeloader' issues in terms of group member (education's direct participants) benefits.

The analysis reveals a tendency to tie the present struggle and resistance to reform with a broader struggle over public recognition of the importance of education. The teachers continued to claim that the struggle was not only about teachers' salaries and work conditions, but that they are fighting against the reform because it did not answer to the real needs of students or the problems of the educational system. (pp. 14)

In making these arguments it was found that many educators employed an in-group vs. out-group strategy.  The following example from a school website framing the argument for the public is illustrative:

This reform does not center around education and pupil welfare. This is an economically driven reform and so budgetary efficiency is at the center. More teaching work hours means less expenses, but more students per teacher, less time to invest in any of the children and advance a significant educational process. The teachers also want reform! But first and foremost a pedagogically driven one that will promote the public education. (pp. 14)

So freeloader concerns certainly crop up in education.  In-group binding within education seems to centre on an orthodoxical attitudes concerning students' best interests.  (the dynamics of short-term vs. long-term interests will have to be delayed for another post).  But how are freeloaders punished?

FREELOADER / NORM VARIATION PUNISHMENT

I think there are at least two insightful ways of looking at the freeloader problem in education:

1. Dig into punishment moderators (in religion, the repentant sinner problem)
2. Rationalize norm variant toleration  (in religion, the uber-classic problem of evil)

Largely because I'm biased toward the dynamics that can emerge from tolerance-intolerance, I favour the second approach, and will expand on that in my next post….


Part 2: Rationalizing Norm Variation Tolerance in Education-as-an-adaptive-group Theory

REFRENCES

Berkovich, I. (2011). No we won't! Teachers' resistance to educational reform. Journal of Educational Administration, Vol. 49(5), 563 - 578.

Basham, P. (2001). Home-schooling: From the extreme to the mainstream. Public Policy Sources, 51, 3-18.
Bielick, S., Chandler, K., & Broughman, S. P. (2002). Homeschooling in the United States: 1999. Education Statistics Quarterly, 1-12. 

Education, what religious model are you?

I usually enjoy silly, online personality tests -provided of course they have just the right amount of silliness and counter-factual propositions in them.  So while I like "what famous movie are you" (Platoon & Raiders of the Lost Ark), I hate utterly loathe the pseudo science of "coloured thinking hats" and the equally pedantic "what are your animal roots". To the latter, my "…bacteria...like everyone else" answer flew over my wife's head...

THE QUESTION

So while browsing my amazon wish list to get a book order off, I started previewing Rossano's Supernatural Selection.  While he was rattling off the standard evolution of religion models, an interesting thought popped into my head; Where amongst the standard (evolution based) science of religion models would large morally bound & institutionalized groups fit?  More specifically, where would the institution of education fit?

MODELS

Rossano categorization follows a pretty standard pattern which smartly eschews the trite adaptive vs. by-product debate.  Models are categorized as follows:

1. commitment - individual benefit from groups which is sustained by free-loader detection routines
2. cognitive - (over)-application of mental modules such as agent detection
3. ecological - helps people manage the natural world (environmental regulation, existential placating, etc.)
4. performance - ceremony and ritual bind people
5. experiential - (not in the google preview, so I'll assume)… satiates proximate needs so it makes you feel good

WHICH MODEL FITS EDUCATION

My sense is people would generally apply the lens of education as a societal coherer (Tyack & Cuban 1995) resulting in a performance based religion model fit for education. 

A commitment model might fit education, but as I've wondered before, to what extent do weak free-loader punishment tendencies minimize fit?  It is possible to argue for a sub-set of the commitment model based on a world religion styled format: a universalist approach which accepts converts and focusses more on aquiescence than free-loader expulsion.  In that case, free loader detection may be more a case of distinguishing between true believers and luke warm marginalists: you know who the go-to people are and whose voice carries weight.

LIKELY HERETICAL COMPLAINTS BY MODEL TYPE

One way to theorize fit is to speculate about the predictions each model would generate with regard to free-loaders and heretics.  Light shadow systems like online education and homeschooling make convenient test points for heretical response evaluation: both delivery methods fit education's rational goal, but still elicit a bit of the disgust response common to things perceived in sacred contexts as "other".

Sitting at the edge of my desk I'd guess both online education and homeschooling present a greater challenge to education should it adhere closer to a performance based model than a commitment model.   Based upon my experience in both fields here's how I see complaints congealing:

• Commitment model - These people get the same degree as we do but without all the work.  Taking the easy road out is likely to eventually cause problems for everyone.  Rigor and the value of intangibles may be useful ex-post facto rationalizing arguments.

• Performance model - They don't get the same things out of their experience as we do.  Therefore their education probably isn't as valid as mine because we really can't trust what went on.  Rigor and the value of intangibles may be useful ex-post facto rationalizing arguments.

Direct teasing of these differences is the realm of research not armchair blogging.  To me, likely rationalizations look to be practically indistinguishable without the help of sophisticated testing methods. 

ARMCHAIR THEORIZING

The success of blended programming (online + face-to-face) in post-secondaries may illuminate things a little.  Currently blended programs are generally seen as adequately rigorous compared to completely face-to-face programs.  However, completely online programs aren't (note: a fair degree of brand association effects occur in post-secondaries that offer mixed program deliveries).  

In terms of a commitment model, this may mean a little perceived free-loading is acceptable, but there's probably a point where it crosses the line.  In terms of a performance model, it may mean blended program students have had enough common ceremony for adequacy while fully online ones haven't. 

The only difference I can see in this line of thinking is that a performance model may be accepting of blended students with just a couple of face-to-face classes while a commitment model may need a greater number of face-to-face classes.  

As a tangent, it would be really interesting to see if there is a sudden phase change in perceptions of equivalence as online course to face-to-face course ratio varies…  This would likely mean non-rational factors are at work, as pure rationality would suggest (but certainly not guarantee) a linear relation.

ARMCHAIR CONCLUSIONS

Thinking this over with some friends (and based upon the ed tech research) I'd wager for a performance model for education.  Students who do a couple of classes face-to-face are generally accepted as having "done their time".  Similarly, students who take a fair proportion of a face-to-face program online generally aren't interpreted as free-loading the system.

The interesting thing is that while the armchair "data" suggests a performance model for education, the rationalizations I usually see people making against online education or homeschooling seem more inline with my interpretation of a commitment model: the easy road out will eventually cause problems for everyone.  An easy explanation for this is anyone breaking religious / group norms is seen as a troublemaker.  Norenzayan's Big Gods work on atheists is good here.

IMPLICATIONS

The scientific study of religion and religious like group dynamics seems to provide interesting perspectives on education's reform dynamics.  At the very least, the dynamics spinning up religious groupings seem to apply to large groups with strong cultures with moral imperatives - like education.